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MOVING CLOSER TO ELIMINATING
DISCRIMINATION IN JURY SELECTION:
A CHALLENGE TO THE PEREMPTORY
I. INTRODUCTION
Anyone who believes that prejudice is not present in the
United States has only to look at the highly publicized
Howard Beach Case in New York.1 There, twelve white
youths participated in a racially motivated attack on three
black men.2 The white youths brutally attacked the three men
using their fists, a baseball bat, and a tree limb.3  One of
the victims, Michael Griffith, tried to escape from his
attackers by running across a busy highway in Queens, New
York.4 While doing so, an automobile struck and killed him.5
Three of the white youths were charged with second-degree
murder for the death of Michael Griffith.6
There are many ways that prejudice can be displayed.
The abhorrent actions of the Howard Beach defendants is just
one of them.7 Usually, prejudice is in the more subtle form
of discrimination. One form of subtle discrimination is when
* The author would like to thank Natalie Sobchak, Stephen Wislocki, and Christine
Tiernan for their guidance, comments, and support.
1. People v. Kern, i49 A-D.2d 187, _ N.E.2d _, 545 N.Y.S.2d 4 (2d Dep't. 1989).
Howard Beach is a predominantly white community in Queens, New York. See also As Piest
Censures Racism as Sin, Howard Beach Deals with Attack, N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1986, at Al,
col. 5.
2. Kern, 149 A.D.2d at 193-94, __ N.E.2d _, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 8-9. Howard Beach
Admission, Daily News, Apr. 11, 1989, at 21, col. 1.
3. Kern, 149 A.D.2d at 201-04, _ N.E.2d _, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 13-14. See also Three
Youths Are Held on Murder in Queens Attack, N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1989, at Al, col. 3
[hereinafter Three Youths].
4. Kern, 149 A.D.2d at 202, _ N.E.2d _, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 13. See also Black Man
Dies after Beating By Whites in Queens, N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1986, at Al, col. 2 [hereinafter
Black Man Dies].
5. Kern, 149 A.D.2d at 202, 205, _ N.E.2d _, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 13-15. Black Man
Dies, supra note 4, at Al, col. 4.
6. Three Youths, supra note 3.
7. See, e.g, Three Youth, supra note 3, at Al, col. 3.
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a juror is excluded from jury service because of his race.
While this discrimination does not rise to the level of
aversion as that of the actions of the Howard Beach
defendants, it is, nevertheless, still intolerable and
unacceptable in a country whose ideals are premised on the
equality of man.9
During the Howard Beach trial, a defense attorney for
one of the defendants used his peremptory challenges to
exclude all the black jurors." The prosecutor argued that
Batson v. Kentucky,11 which held that the equal protection
clause prohibits a prosecutor from challenging potential jurors
solely on account of their race, should be applied to the
defense counsel. 2 The issue of whether defense counsel in a
criminal case may exclude prospective jurors because of their
race was left unresolved by the United States Supreme Court
in Batson. 3
In the Howard Beach case, however, the trial court had
to resolve this issue in order to continue the trial. The trial
court ruled that Batson applies to the defense as well as the
prosecution. 4  The defendants immediately sought an
interlocutory appeal.1 5 The intermediate appellate court in
New York had an opportunity to render a decisive decision on
the applicability of Batson to the defense counsel.16 Instead,
the appellate court passed on this issue and dismissed the
appeal on procedural grounds. 7 The appellate court stated
that the proper procedure was for the defendants to wait until
8. See general, Massaro, Peremptories or Peers?--Rethinldng Sixh Amendment Doctrine,
Images and Procedures, 64 N.C.L. REv. 501, 507 [hereinafter Massaro].
9. See, e.g, U.S. CONSr. amend. XIV, § 1.
10. Counsel Ordered to Justify Challenges of Black Jurors, N.Y.LJ., Sept. 22, 1987, at 1,
col. 3 [hereinafter Counsel].
11. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
12. Counsel, supra note 10, at col. 4.
13. Batson, 476 U.S. at 89 n.12.
14. Ladone v. Demakos, 33 A.D.2d 435, 435, 519 N.Y.S.2d 417, 418 (2d Dep't 1987).
15. Id. at 436.
16. Ladone, 133 A.D.2d 435, 519 N.Y.S.2d 417 (2d Dep't 1987).
17. Id at 435, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 417.
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there had been a conviction and then bring an appeal.'" The
defendants were subsequently convicted at trial. 9
This paper will address many of the issues involved when
there is discrimination in jury selection procedures. First, it
will discuss the background and importance of the jury and
peremptory challenge system and the development and
importance of the elimination of discrimination in the jury
selection process. Next, it will discuss the Batson decision;
pointing out the decision's weaknesses and offer solutions to
some of its problems. Finally, this note will argue for the
extension of Batson to the defense side and other areas, and
/in the alternative, the elimination of the peremptory challenge
system.
1I. THE JURY SYSTEM AND PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGES
A. The Jury System
The jury system is not a recent development in American
Jurisprudence.' It has been used in the United States since
the first beginnings of the country.2' The right to a jury trial
was considered very important to the colonists. 22 Thomas
Jefferson wrote that it was the "[o]nly anchor . . . by which
a government can be held to the principles of it's [sic]
constitution."'  Despite some minor alterations to the jury
18. Id. at 436, _ N.E.2d at _, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 419.
19. People v. Kern, 149 A.D.2d 187, 207, _ N.E.2d _, 545 N.Y.S.2d 4, 16-17 (2d
Dep't 1989). See also A Key Witness Missing in Howard Beach Case, N.Y. Times, June 7,
1988, at B3, col. 4. The defendants appealed their convictions. This time the intermediate
appellate court held that the Batson decision applies to the defense as well as to the
prosecution.
20. Massaro, supra note 8, at 507-08.
21. Id. at 504-06.
22. Massaro, supra note 8, at 507-08.
23. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Paine, July 11, 1789, reprinted in T.
JEFFERSON, THE PAPERS OF THoMAS JEFFERSON 266, 269 (J. Boyd ed. 1958).
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system,24 it is still used today.
It has been said that "the jury represents democracy in
the courtroom."' As such, it protects several important
values. These values include community preservation,
government stability, and the protection of a defendant's
interests.2 The United States Supreme Court has described
the jury as an "instrument[ ] of public justice."'  More
specifically, the Supreme Court wrote that the jury provides
a "safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor
and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge."'
The appearance of a jury's fairness is essential.
Otherwise, people will begin to distrust jury verdicts even if a
"correct" verdict was reached. 2 An example of what might
happen if a jury's verdict is perceived as "unfair" occurred in
Miami, Florida. There, riots erupted after several all white
juries acquitted police officers charged with the killing of a
few black people.'
The appearance of a jury's fairness is determined not only
by its verdict but also by its visual appearance." Therefore,
the procedures used in selecting the jury should strive to
produce a jury that will correspond to people's images of a
fair jury. 2 One way to enhance the appearance of a jury's
fairness is through popular community participation. If all
members of the community are able to participate, then public
confidence in the verdict would be instilled and the community
24. See, e.g., UTAH' CONST. 'art. 1, § 10 (an eight member jury is used in all criminal
trials except capital offense trials); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 913.10 (West 1985) (six jurors are
required in all criminal trials except capital offense trials).
25. 1 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 280-87 (H. Reeve ed. 1945). See
also Gurney, The Case for Abolishing Peremptory Challenges in Criminal Trials, 21 HARv.
C.R.-C.L. L. RLv. 227 (1986) [hereinafter Gurney].
26. Massaro, supra note 8, at 511.
27. Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940).
28. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
29. Massaro, supra note 8, at 517.
30. Florida Court Overturns Swain Rule, Nat'l LJ., Oct. 22, 1984, at 30, col. 1.
31. Massaro, supra note 8, at 517.
32. Id.
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would be more willing to accept the verdict.3
B. Peremptory Challenges
There are many ways a jury's composition could be
affected. One way is through the use of peremptory
challenges. Generally, the peremptory challenge permits an
attorney to remove prospective jurors from the venire." The
challenge is "exercised without a reason being stated [and]
without inquiry."3 The attorney may be arbitrary, capricious,
or even irrational in making his decision on whom to
challenge.' Attorneys frequently rely on numerous factors in
making their decision. Some factors are the demeanor, facial
expressions, dress, and gender of the prospective juror. 7
Attorneys also rely on the prospective juror's responses to voir
dire38 questions.39  Consequently, the voir dire tends to be
extensive and probing.4"
The use of peremptory challenges has been a "part of
the common law for many centuries and part of our jury
system for nearly 200 years" 41  The peremptory challenge
came "from the common law with the trial by jury.142  While
"[t]here is nothing in the Constitution ... which requires ...
Congress to grant peremptory challenges to defendants, '13 and
the right to use a peremptory challenge "may be withheld
33. Id. at 512.
34. The venire is a panel of jurors summoned to serve as jurors. BLACKS LAW
DICTONARY 1395 (5th ed. 1979) [hereinafter BLACKS].
35. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965).
36. Chew v. State, 71 Md. App. 681, 685, 527 A2d 332, 334 (1987).
37. Massaro, supra note 8, at 520.
38. Voir dire is the preliminary examination of a prospective juror to determine bias or
connection with the case tried. See BLACKS, supra note 34, at 1412.
39. Massaro, supra note 8, at 520.
40. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 218-19 (1965).
41. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 112 (1986) (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
42. Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892).
43. Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919).
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altogether,u Congress, nevertheless, decided that peremptory
challenges were to be permitted.'5 Currently, in the Federal
jurisdiction, if a capital offense is involved, then the
government and the defense are each entitled to twenty
peremptory challenges.' However, if the offense is
punishable by one or more years of imprisonment, then the
government is entitled to six challenges and the defense ten. 7
On the other hand, if the offense is punishable by less than
one year of imprisonment, then both sides are each entitled
to three peremptory challenges.'
At the state level, the development of peremptory
challenges paralleled that of the federal government.49 By
1870, most states granted peremptory challenges to the
prosecutor and the defendant.5' Today, the number of
peremptories allocated to each side varies from state to
state.5 ' For example, New York52 allocates a maximum of
twenty peremptory challenges to each side, while Vermont53
allocates six to each side. The total combined number granted
to both sides varies from state to state between a high of
fifty-two in California, 51 to a low of eight in Virginia. 55 As in
the federal jurisdiction, the number of peremptories allocated
to the prosecution and the defense is not always equal. For
example, Georgia allocates twenty to the defense while only
44. Frazier v. United States, 335 U.S. 497, 505 n.11 (1948).
45. See 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1977) (permits peremptory challenges in civil trials); FED.
R. CrUM. P. 24(B) (permits peremptory challenges in criminal trials); Swain v. Alabama, 380
U.S. 202, 214 (1965) (discussing the development of Congressional action in the area of
peremptory challenges).
46. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b).
47. id.
48. Id.
49. Swain, 380 U.S. at 215.
50. Id. at 216.
51. See Gurney, supra note 25, at 228 n.5 (where every state peremptory statute is
listed).
52. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 270.25 (McKinney 1982).
53. VT. R. CR. P. 24(c)(3) (1983).
54. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1070(a) (West 1982 & Supp. 1985).
55. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-262 (1983).
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granting ten to the prosecution.- The average number of
peremptories given by all the states is thirteen to the defense
and eleven to the prosecution.
There are many arguments for the need of peremptory
challenges. The most prominent ones are that 1) they permit
the elimination of jurors whom the lawyers fear they may have
alienated in voir dire;7 and 2) they can be used to remove
prospective jurors who are believed to be biased but who deny
any bias on voir dire.5" It is argued that peremptory challenges
enable the attorneys to be assured that jurors will decide the
case only on the evidence placed before them. 9 In this way,
the peremptory challenge system seeks to guarantee "not only
freedom from any bias against the accused, but also from any
prejudice against his prosecution. ' 60
The peremptory challenge is distinguished from the
challenge for cause. The challenge for cause permits an
attorney to remove a juror for a "narrowly specified, provable
and legally cognizable basis of partiality."61 The peremptory
challenge, on the other hand, permits removal for a "real or
ifiagined partiality that is less easily designated or
demonstrable. 62 The trial judge has discretion on whether to
grant or deny a challenge for cause. 3
There are two peremptory challenge systems currently in
use in the United States: the "struck system" and the
"sequential system." Under the "struck system," the number
of jurors present during voir dire is equal to the size of the
petit jury" plus the total number of peremptory challenges
56. GA. CODE ANN. § 15-12-165 (1985).
57. Massaro, supra note 8, at 527.
58. id.
59. Id.
60. Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887).
61. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965).
62. id.
63. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1977).
64. The petit jury is distinguished from the grand jury. The petit jury is the one used
for trials. The grand jury issues an indictment. See BLAcK's, supra note 34, at 768.
210 [Vol. VII
allocated to each side.6' After the voir dire, both parties use
their challenges for cause. Those jurors who have been
challenged are replaced with new jurors who are then
questioned during voir dire. After the process is completed,
depending on the jurisdiction, the attorneys will either use all
their peremptory challenges at once or alternate their use
from one attorney to the other.
Under the "sequential system," the number of jurors to
participate in voir dire is equal to the size of the petit jury."
After each individual is examined, both attorneys use their
peremptory and cause challenges. Those jurors that are
removed are replaced with new ones. This process continues
until all the peremptory and cause challenges have been used
and there are enough jurors to form the petit jury.
II. EuMINATING DISCRIMINATION IN THE
JURY SELECTION PROCESS As A WHOLE
The fourteenth amendment provides, in relevant part, that
"[N]o state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws."67  The amendment was
proposed by Congress on June 16, 186668 and, was ratified two
years later on July 28, 1868.69 While the primary purpose of
the fourteenth amendment was to benefit the recently freed
slaves,70 the phrase "any person," nevertheless, enables all
people7 to benefit from it.
Within twelve years of the fourteenth amendment's
ratification, the United States Supreme Court decided a trilogy
65. Gurney, supra note 25, at 228.
66. id.
67. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
68. T. NORTON, THE CONS1=ON OF THE UNITED STATES ITS SOURCES AND ITS
APPUCATION 235 (1945) [hereinafter NORTON].
69. Chew v. State, 71 Md. App. 681, 684, 527 A.2d 332, 334 (1987).
70. NORTON, supra note 68 at 244.
71. The benefits of the fourteenth amendment have been extended to corporations.
Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
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of cases". that dealt with jury selection procedures.
Collectively, these cases established the rule that a black
defendant is denied equal protection of the law when a state
prevents black people from participating on juries.73  In
Strauder v. West Virginia,74 a state statute that prohibited black
people from participating on grand or petit juries was found
unconstitutional.75 In Virginia v. Rives,76 the Court held that
when a state's jury commissioner purposely selects only white
jurors there is a denial of equal protection." Finally, in Ex
Parte Virginia,78 a judge, who was given the power under a
state statute to select jurors, was prohibited from
discriminating in selecting jurors.79  The Supreme Court's
holdings in these and all other jury selection cases have
focused only on preventing exclusion. The Court has never
required the inclusion of any group or individual.' °
Since 1880, several legal theories have been used to
prevent discrimination in jury selection procedures. For
example, the sixth amendment right to an impartial jury has
been used."1 Also, the Supreme Court has relied on its
supervisory power over the federal courts.82 However, the
most commonly used legal theory has been the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 3
72. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313
(1879); Ex pane Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
73. Id.
74. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 303.
75. Id. at 310.
76. Vuginia, 100 U.S. at 313.
77. Id. at 322.
78. Ex Pane Virginia, 100 U.S. at 339.
79. Id. at 348.
80. Massaro, supra note 8, at 529.
81. See, e.g, Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975); Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357
(1979).
82. See, e.g., Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 225 (1946); Ballard v. United
States, 329 U.S. 187, 193 (1946).
83. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See, eg., Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965);
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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Generally, for an equal protection claim, two
requirements must be met. First, there must be proof of a
discriminatory purpose, rather than simply a racially
disproportionate impact.' Second, there must be "state
action.""a5 This "state action" requirement is derived from the
language of the fourteenth amendment itself." While the
fourteenth amendment applies only to states, the due process
clause of the fifth amendment imposes the same strictures
upon the federal government as the equal protection clause
imposes on the states.87 As a result, the federal government
cannot deny equal protection of the laws either.
The Supreme Court has adopted four "tests" to determine
the presence of "state action."'  None of these represents a
"bright line test." Consequently, to determine the presence
of "state action," a "fact-bound inquiry"89 is usually required.
It is "[o]nly by sifting facts and weighing circumstances"'9 that
a determination can be made of whether, there is "state
action." Clearly, if a state statute requires a state official to
do an act, then this would be "state action." However, the
presence of "state action" is not always clear. For example,
when there is no state mandate, nor a state official involved,
then the question becomes more difficult.
84. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
85. Id. at 240.
86. The fourteenth amendment provides that "no state" shall deny equal protection. U.S.
CON ST. amend. XIV, §1.
87. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
88. The "Public Function test," Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469-70 (1953); Marsh
v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506-07 (1946). The "State Compulsion test," Adickes v. S.H. Kress
& Co., 398 U.S. 144, 170 (1970). The "Nexus test," Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419
U.S. 345, 351 (1974); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 724 (1961).
The "Joint Action test," Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 157 (1978).
89. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939 (1982).
90. Burton, 365 U.S. at 722.
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IV. ELIMINATING DISCRIMINATION - IN THE
USE OF PEREMPTORY QALLENGES
The issue of whether there is "state action" and whether
there has been a violation of the equal protection clause is
present when a prosecutor uses his peremptory challenges in
a discriminatory manner. The first United States Supreme
Court decision addressing this issue was Swain v. Alabama.9
In Swain, a black defendant was indicted for the rape of a
seventeen year old white girl. 92 At the trial the prosecutor
used his peremptory challenges to remove all six prospective
black jurors.93 The resulting all-white Alabama jury convicted
the defendant. 94 The defendant was subsequently sentenced
to death.9
The Supreme Court in Swain reiterated its previously
established rule that a state may not purposefully or
deliberately deny black people from participating as jurors.96
However, the Court further stated that a defendant "is not
constitutionally entitled to demand a proportionate number of
his race on the jury which tries him. 97 The Court held that
a defendant must show "the prosecutor's systematic use of
peremptory challenges'"9 against black people over a period of
time. It was not enough for the defendant to rely onthe facts
from his particular case. The Court concluded that the
defendant failed to meet his burden.99 The Court declined to
hold that the removal of blacks in a particular case would be
a denial of equal protection."l The Court felt that this would
91. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
92. Swain v. Alabama, 275 Ala. 508, 509, 156 So. 2d 368, 369 (1963).
93. Swain, 380 U.S. at 205.
94. Id. at 203.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 203-04.
97. Id. at 208.
98. Id. at 227.
99. Id. at 226.
100. Id. at 222.
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"entail a radical change in the nature and operation ' 1°1 of the
peremptory challenge and would be "wholly at odds with the
peremptory challenge system"' 2 as it was then understood.
There was a great deal of criticism in the aftermath of
Swain. One criticism was that the burden the Swain decision
placed on the defendant was too great.03 The subsequent
cases adhering to the Swain test "indicated the virtual
impossibility"'" of the defendant showing systematic exclusion
by the -prosecutor. In almost all of these cases, the
defendants failed to meet the Swain burden.
105
Another criticism of Swain is that the requirement to
show systematic exclusion over a period of time does not
square with the traditional premise behind the equal
protection clause. That is, under the Constitution, each
individual defendant is guaranteed the right to equal
protection of the laws.1' 6 The argument is that after Swain,
it would not be until a series of defendants have been
deprived of their equal protection rights that a violation could
then be shown.07 The argument continues that the absence
of discrimination against past defendants should not defeat
the present defendant from proving discrimination in his
particular case."~ In effect, Swain allowed a-prosecutor to use
his peremptory challenges to shape the racial composition of
a particular jury °
101. Id. at 221-22.
102. Id. at .222.
103. See, eg, Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 92 (1986).
104. 2 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 213.3(d) (1984).
105. Cawley, People v. Payne and the Prosecution's Peremptory Challenges: Will They Be
Preempted?, 32 DE PAUL L REV. 399, 403 n.27 (1983) [hereinafter Cawley]. See, e.g., United
States v. Carter, 528 F.2d 844 (8th Cir. 1975), cert denied, 425 U.S. 961 (1976); United States
v. Danzey, 476 F. Supp. 1065 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), affid met, 620 F.2d 286 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 878 (1980). The cases in which the defendants have met the Swain burden
are relatively few in number. See, e., State v. Brown, 371 So. 2d 751 (La. 1979); State v.
Washington, 375 So. 2d 1162 (La. 1979).
106. See U.S. CONsr. amend. XIV, § 1.
107. Massaro, supra note 8, at 536.
108. Id.
109. Cawley, supra note 105, at 404 (emphasis added).
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An additional criticism of Swain is that the Supreme
Court acknowledged that racial factors were a legitimate basis
for using peremptory challenges.1 ' The majority in Swain
stated that peremptory challenges are:
frequently exercised on grounds normally thought
irrelevant to legal proceedings or official action,
namely, the race, religion, [or] nationality.
of people summoned for jury duty
[V]eniremen are not always judged solely as
individuals . . [but] are challenged in light of
the limited knowledge counsel has of them, which
may include their group affiliations."'
It is argued that this rationale accepts the notion that "[a]ll
persons who share an attribute, such as the same skin color,
will ipso facto view matters in the same way, and that minority
groups are less able than whites to decide the case solely on
the basis of the evidence."'1
2
Because of the criticism against the Swain decision, many
jurisdictions declined to follow it. At least two federal circuits
and some state courts declined to follow Swain.' Usually,
the state courts based their decision on state constitutional
grounds." 4
The Swain decision did very little to further the goals of
eliminating discrimination in the administration of justice as a
whole. Indeed, in a different context, the Supreme Court, in
1979, noted that "[r]acial and other forms of discrimination
still remain a fact of life, in the administration of justice as in
110. Id.
111. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220-21 (1965).
112. McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113, 1131 (2d Cir. 1984).
113. Id. at 1113; Booker v. Jabe, 775 F.2d 762 (6th Cir. 1985). See also People v.
Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978); Commonwealth v. Soares,
377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499 (1979).
114. See Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 258, 583 P.2d at 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 890; Soares, 377
Mass. at 461, 387 N.E.2d at 499.
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our society as a whole. Perhaps today that discrimination
takes a form more subtle than before. But it is not less real
or pernicious." '115
Similarly, despite the Swain decision, the prosecution's
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges continued. For
example, from 1972 to 1973, federal prosecutors in Louisiana
used their peremptory challenges three times more often
against black jurors than would be expected if jurors were
randomly removed.116  Additionally, from 1974 to 1976,
federal prosecutors in three Connecticut cities used their
peremptory challenges to remove 59.2% of the black jurors
from the jury pool in trials involving white defendants.
1 1 7
This is compared with 84.8% of the black jurors being
removed in trials where the defendant was black or
hispanic."' l
There are also indications that the defense has used
peremptory challenges in a discriminatory manner. For
example, in 1983, a New Jersey man was charged with the
murder of a hispanic boy.1 9 The killing was done as part of
a game by using a car to get points for "picking off spics and
niggers"'" At the trial, the defendant's attorney used his
peremptory challenges to remove all black and hispanic
jurors.12' The all white jury rejected the murder charge and
convicted the defendant of the lesser charge of aggravated
manslaughter. 22
The above examples illustrate that a need existed for
further evolution towards the elimination of the discriminatory
use of peremptory challenges. However, the Swain test
remained the law under equal protection analysis for
115. Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 558-59 (1979).
116. Gurney, supra note 25, at 232.
117. Id
118. Id
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twenty-one years.'23 It was not until 1986, in Batson v.
Kentucky,124 when the Supreme Court finally revised the
Swain test. In Batson, a black man was indicted for
second-degree burglary."z On the first day of trial, the
prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to remove all four
black people from the venire.'26 The jury was then composed
of only white people."V The defense attorney objected,
arguing that the defendant's sixth amendment right to a jury
drawn from a cross section of the community and the
defendant's equal protection rights had been violated."2
The Batson Court initially recognized that the defendant
does have a right to a jury selected by non-discriminatory
criteria."2  The Court stated that a prosecutor's use of
peremptory challenges is subject to the strictures of the equal
protection clause." The Court felt that "[t]he Equal
Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential
jurors solely on account of their race or on the assumption
that black jurors as a group will be unable impartially to
consider the State's case against a black defendant."31 The
Court recognized three harms that occur when there is
discrimination in jury selection. First, there is harm to the
defendant "whose life or liberty" the jury is summoned to
try.132  Second, the State. unconstitutionally discriminates
against the excluded juror when it excludes him because of
his race. Finally, the entire community is affected"M
123. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
124. id.
125. Id at 82.
126. Id at 83.
127. Id
128. Id
129. Id at 85-86.
130. d at 89.
131. Id





because discriminatory practices in jury selection "undermine
public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice."135
The Court rejected the Swain test because it "placed on
defendants a crippling burden of proof"' and thereby
allowed the prosecutor's peremptory challenge to be "largely
immune from constitutional scrutiny. "137 The Court proceeded
to formulate a new test. First, the defendant must show that
he is a member of a "cognizable racial group. '"" Then he
must show that the prosecutor used his peremptory
challenges to remove members of the defendant's race from
the venire.1 39 The defendant "is entitled to rely on the fact, as
to which there can be no dispute, that peremptory challenges
constitute a jury selection practice that permits those to
discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate." 4" Finally, the
defendant must show that there is an inference that the
prosecutor removed those members on account of their
race.
1 41
Once the defendant shows these three criteria, the trial
judge must decide if the defendant has demonstrated a "prima
facie case" of discrimination against black jurors. 41 If the
defendant has made a prima facie case, then the burden shifts
to the prosecution to give a ',neutral explanation '1 43 for
challenging the black jurors. However, this explanation "need
not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for
cause.1 44 Once the prosecutor gives his explanation, the trial
judge must decide if the "defendant has established purposeful
135. Id
136. Id at 92.
137. Id at 92-93.
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discrimination. '" 5
The Court noted the importance of the peremptory
challenge system but nevertheless concluded that its decision
would not "undermine the contribution the challenge generally
makes to the administration of justice."'" The Court felt that
"[iun view of the heterogeneous population of our Nation,
public respect for our criminal justice system and the rule of
law will be strengthened if we ensure that no citizen is
disqualified from jury service because of his race."147
Chief Justice Burger developed three main arguments in
his dissent. First, he noted that in the past, the Supreme
Court has invalidated classifications based on gender, religious
or political affiliation, mental capacity, number of children,
living arrangements, and employment in a particular industry
or profession.1 48 The Chief Justice feared that the Batson
decision would be extended to these other equal protection
claims thus subjecting every peremptory challenge to
fourteenth amendment scrutiny. 49 His second argument was
that the majority's decision, by requiring an explanation, would
have the effect of forcing "the peremptory challenge [to]
collapse into the challenge for cause."'50 A third argument
was that the majority's decision would in effect "[i]nterject
racial matters back into the jury selection process, contrary
to the general thrust of a long line of Court decisions."'' He
argued that this would happen because attorneys would be
forced to inquire into the "racial background and national
origin"'152 of the jurors in order for the attorneys to build a
record to support their claim of discriminatory use of
145. Id at 98.
146. Id at 98-99.
147. Id at 99.
148. Id at 124 (Burger, C., dissenting).
149. Id
150. Id at 127.





The majority in Batson in effect moved the balancing
demarcation line of Swain to a more favorable position for
the defendant.15 4  In Swain, the Supreme Court struck the
balance more in favor of the free use of peremptory
challenges while making the burden on the defendant great.11
5
However, in Batson the Supreme Court allowed some
encroachment into the area of peremptory challenges in order
to relieve the defendant of a practically insurmountable
burden.
156
In addition to the Swain and Batson decisions, the United
States Congress has made attempts to make advances
towards eliminating discrimination in jury selection
procedures. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 243 makes it a federal
crime for a state official who is charged with the duty of
selecting or summoning jurors to exclude or fail to summon
any person because of their race.1 The statutory provision
provides that "[n]o citizen possessing all other qualifications
which are or may be prescribed by law shall be disqualified
for service as grand or petit juror in any court of the United
States, or of any State on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude."158 While this provision grants the
federal government the power to prosecute when a
prospective juror has been excluded, prosecutions under this
section have been rare. 59 Also, this section appears to be
limited to the selection of the venire as opposed to the
selection of the petit jury.1
60
153. l
154. Id at 92-96.
155. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 227 (1965).
156. Batson, 476 U.S. at 93-94.
157. 18 U.S.C. § 243 (1979).
158. Id
159. Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 558 (1979).
160. 18 U.S.C. § 243 discusses officers "charged with [the] duty" of summoning jurors.
18 U.S.C. § 243 (1979). Also, there is currently no case law interpreting § 243 as applying
to the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges.
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In addition to Section 243, 28 U.S.C. § 1862 provides
that "[n]o citizen shall be excluded from service as a grand or
petit juror in the district courts of the United States or in the
Court of International Trade on account of race, color,
religion, sex, national origin, or economic status. 161 Section
1862 was drafted as part of the Jury Selection and Service
Act of 1968.162 The legislative history behind this Act makes
clear that Section 1862, like Section 243, applies only to the
selection of the venire as opposed to the selection of the petit
jury. 163 Consequently, even after the adoption of these
statutes, there was still a gap that allowed discrimination to
continue in the jury selection process. That is, defendants
were still permitted to discriminate in selecting jurors.
Some commentators argue that the relevant part of the
Constitution is not the equal protection clause but the sixth
amendment.'" They argue that if black and white defendants
are both tried by juries where members of their respective
race have been excluded, then the black and white defendants
have been treated equally. 6 Consequently, there would then
be no violation of the equal protection clause even though
people have been excluded because of their race. They
conclude that if the prohibition against the discriminatory use
of peremptory challenges was based on the sixth amendment,
then this would this incongruous result would be eliminated.
The sixth amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . an
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed.""6  This amendment has been
161. 28 U.S.C. § 1862 (1977).
162. Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-274 § 1862, 82 Stat. 53,
1968 U.S. CoDE. CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 1792.
163. Its purpose is to assure that "all qualified citizens will have the opportunity to be
considered for jury service." Id (emphasis added). "The proposed bill preserves the
traditional right of the parties to challenge a juror for cause or to strike him peremptorily"
Id at 1797.
164. See, e.g., Massaro, supra note 8, at 503.
165. Id at 536.
166. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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incorporated into the fourteenth amendment and is, therefore,
applicable to the states.'67  The sixth amendment contains
the only specific constitutional language relating to the
composition of the jury.1'6 Some courts have based their
decision to prohibit the discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges on the sixth amendment.169 For example, the
Second Circuit used the sixth amendment to hold that a
defendant may attack a prosecutor's use of peremptory
challenges if the defendant can show a "[s]ubstantial
likelihood that the challenges . . . have been made on the
basis of the individual venire persons' group affiliation." 70
However, there are other courts that have specifically
rejected the sixth amendment claim. 1 '
While the sixth amendment does not specifically require
a venire to be composed from a fair cross section of the
community, the Supreme Court, nevertheless, engrafted this
requirement onto it in Taylor v. Louisiana." In Taylor, the
issue was "[w]hether the presence of a fair cross section of
the community on venires, panels or lists from which petit
juries are drawn is essential to the fulfillment of the sixth
amendment's guarantee of an impartial jury trial in criminal
prosecutions." '73 The Court held that it was. 74 The Court
gave two reasons for this "cross section" requirement. First,
it helps to form a representative jury which will protect
against the "overzealous or mistaken prosecutor"175 and the
"professional or perhaps overconditioned or biased response
167. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
168. U.S. CONsr. amend. VI.
169. See supra note 101.
170. McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113, 1132 (1984).
171. See, eg., Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226, 230 (8th Cir. 1985); United States cc
rel. Palmer v. DeRobertis, 738 F.2d 168, 172 (7th Cir. 1984); Willis v. Zant, 720 F.2d 1212,
1219 n.14 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. Whitfield, 715 F.2d 145, 146-47 (4th Cir. 1983);
Weathersby v. Morris, 708 F.2d 1493, 1497 (9th Cir. 1983).
172. 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975).
173. Id at 526.
174. Id at 528.
175. Id at 530.
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of a judge." '176 Second, this requirement furthers "community
participation ' 177 which is "critical to public confidence in the
fairness of the criminal justice system."
178
The term "cross section of the community" was explained
by the Supreme Court in Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co:
179
[it] does not mean, of course, that every jury
must contain representatives of all the economic,
social, religious, racial, political and geographical
groups of the community; frequently such
complete representation would be impossible.
But it does mean that prospective jurors shall be
selected by court officials without systematic and
intentional exclusion of any of these groups."'
While the Taylor Court placed the burden on the
defendant to prove a sixth amendment violation, the Court
never explicitly spelled out what the defendant must show.1 8
Subsequent to Taylor, the Supreme Court decided Duren v.
Missouri.! There, the Court summarized what a defendant
must show in order to prove a violation of the "fair cross
section" requirement. He must be able to show:
1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a
"distinctive" group in the community;
2) that the representation of this group in venires
from which juries are selected is not fair and
reasonable in relation to the number of such




179. 328 U.S. 217 (1946).
180. Id. at 220.
181. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 522.
182. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
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3) that this underrepresentation is due to
systematic exclusion of the group in the jury
selection process.
18 3
There is a distinction between how a sixth amendment
violation is shown and how an equal protection violation
under Batson is shown. Under the Taylor-Duren analysis of
the sixth amendment, the emphasis is on the composition of
the venire."8  A showing of purposeful discrimination is
irrelevant." 5 Under the Batson analysis, the defendant must
show that the prosecutor eliminated prospective jurors
because of their race."8 6 In effect, the defendant must show
purposeful discrimination."7 Because the showing of intent
is usually more difficult than merely showing the composition
of a jury, the defendant's burden under the Batson test is,
therefore, more onerous than his burden under the sixth
amendment.
There is also a distinction between the scope of the sixth
amendment and the scope of the fourteenth amendment.
The language of the sixth amendment limits its application
to criminal cases, 18 and the right to an impartial jury is only
available to the accused. 89  Under the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment, there is no such
limitation. 1"°  Consequently, the applicability of the sixth
amendment is narrower.
The Batson Court could quite easily have based its
decision on the sixth amendment. While it is true the
Supreme Court made clear in Taylor that its "fair cross
section" requirement would apply only to jury venires and
183. Id. at 364.
184. United States v. Perez-Hernandez, 672 F.2d 1380, 1384 n.5 (11th Cir. 1982).
185. Id.
186. See supra notes 125-32 and accompanying text.
187. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
188. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
189. Id.
190. See U.S. CONSr. amend. XIV, § 1.
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lists,", and not to the petit juries chosen from them, 192  the
extension of the Taylor-Duren rule to the prosecution's use of
peremptory challenges would have been the next logical step.
That is, if under the Taylor-Duren rule the state cannot
systematically exclude black people from the venire, then
certainly a state prosecutor should not be able to circumvent
this sixth amendment requirement through the use of his
peremptory challenges.
In fact, the defendant in Batson argued to extend the
Taylor-Duren rule by holding that the sixth amendment
prohibits the prosecutor from using his peremptory challenges
"to exclude all or most members of an identifiable class from
participation as jurors. 193  The Supreme Court in Batson
stated that it expressed no view on the merits of the
defendant's sixth amendment arguments.194  Instead, the
Court based its decision on the equal protection clause.195
However, while declining to express any view on the sixth
amendment, the Court, in formulating its test, in effect
adopted an offshoot of a state court decision based on the
sixth amendment.1" While the Court expressly declined to
discuss the sixth amendment, it nevertheless adopted the
traditional sixth amendment test that was in use by some
state courts at the time. 97
The Supreme Court must have been aware of the obvious
distinction between the equal protection clause and the sixth
191. The Supreme Court stated that the "fair cross section" requirement would apply
only to "jury wheels, pools of names, panels or venires from which juries are drawn." Taylor
v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975) (Renquist, J., dissenting).
192. The Taylor Court stated that it imposed "[n]o requirement that petit juries actually
chosen must mirror the community and reflect the various distinctive groups in the
population." Id.
193. Brief for Petitioner at 17, Batsan v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (No. 84-6263).
194. Batson, 476 U.S. at 85 n.4.
195. Id. at 89.
196. The Batson test is substantially similar to a test used by a California court deciding
a sixth amendment type issue. See People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 280, 282, 583 P.2d 748,
764-65, 148 Cal. Rptr 890, 905-06 (1978). The defendant in Batson argued for the use of this
test. See Brief for Petitioner at 26-30, Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (No. 84-6263).
197. Gurney, supra note 25, at 241-42.
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amendment. Therefore, an argument can be made that the
Court's choice to base its decision on the equal protection
clause was not just a haphazard decision but an intentional
choice between two constitutional clauses that have two
different scopes. If the Batson decision were based on the
sixth amendment, then while the defendant's burden would
not be too great, the decision could not be extended to
situations other than a defendant in a criminal trial.
However, by basing the decision on the equal protection
clause, the defendant's burden is slightly tougher, but there
is the possibility of extending Batson further to other
situations. If the Supreme Court was aware of this obvious
distinction, and common sense seems to suggest that it must
have been, then the Court must have intended or anticipated
Batson to be extended through its later decisions or those of
the lower level courts.
IV. POST BATSON - UNRESOLVED ISSUES;
THE NEED FOR FURTHER ANSWERS
The Batson decision left a morass of unresolved issues
for the lower courts. One issue to be resolved was whether
the decision should be applied retroactively or
prospectively. 9 ' In Justice White's concurrence in Batson, he
opposed applying the test retroactively.' This issue was
quickly resolved by the Supreme Court in two cases. In
Allen v. Hardy," the Court held that Batson should not be
applied retroactively to cases on federal habeas corpus
review." 1 However, in Griffith v. Kentucky,"°2 the Supreme
Court held that Batson would be applied to cases still
pending on direct review or not yet final, as of the date of the
198. Batson, 476 U.S. at 102 (White, J., concurring).
199. Id.
200. 478 U.S. 255 (1986).
201. Id. at 257-58.
202. 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
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Batson decision. 3
Another unresolved issue, perhaps one of the most
important ones, is whether all prohibited classifications under
the equal protection clause are to be scrutinized by the
Batson test. In Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Batson,20 4 he
concluded that the majority must not have intended this
result. The Chief Justice argued: "[t]hat the Court is not
applying conventional Equal Protection analysis is shown by its
limitation of its new rule to allegations of impermissible
challenge on the 'basis of race'; the Court's opinion clearly
contains such a limitation." However, it is not clear how the
Batson decision can rest on the equal protection clause and
not incorporate general equal protection law principles. 6 It
would seem odd for the Supreme Court to hold that in the
jury selection process, the equal protection clause is available
only to black defendants. Consequently, Batson must logically
be extended beyond being applied to just black defendants.
The Batson decision also left unresolved the precise
meaning of the phrase "cognizable racial group. '2°7 There
have been many cognizable groups that have alleged
peremptory challenge abuses. Some of them include Puerto
Ricans, Mexican-Americans, whites, Alaskan natives, and
persons with French surnames.m Some defendants have even
attempted to extend the Batson protection to non-racial
groups. °9 If the Supreme Court did not intend for Batson to
203. Id at 316.
204. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 123 (1986) (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
205. id at 123-24.
206. Chew v. State, 71 Md. App. 681, 710, 527 A.2d 332, 346-47 (1987).
207. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.
208. See, e.g., United States v. Canel, 708 F.2d 894, 898 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104
S. Ct. 166 (1983) (Puerto Ricans); Cano v. State, 663 S.W.2d 598, 602 (Tex. Crim. App.
1983) (Mexican-Americans); Doepel v. United States, 434 A.2d 449, 457-58 (D.C. 1981)
(whites); Mallot v. State, 608 P.2d 737, 750-52 (Alaska 1980) (Alaska natives);
Commonwealth v. Gagnon, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 110, 117-21, 449 N.E.2d 686, 690-93 (1983)
(people with French surnames).
209. See, e.g., United States v. Cresta, 825 F.2d 538 (1st Cir. 1987) (using young adults
as a group); Commonwealth v. Reid, 384 Mass. 247, 254, 424 N.E.2d 495, 500 (1981) (males);
Patri v. Percy, 530 F. Supp. 591, 595-96 (E.D. Wis. 1982) (women); People v. Kagan, 101
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have such a broad scope, then perhaps as a way of curtailing
the scope, Batson could be extended to only groups
"exhibiting a historical pattern of long-standing suffering from
discrimination."210
The Batson Court declined to formulate any precise
procedures to be followed in implementing its test.21  The
Court stated "[i]n light of the variety of jury selection practices
followed in our state and federal trial courts, we make no
attempt to instruct these courts how best to implement our
holding today."212 Instead the Batson Court put the burden on
the trial courts to settle the unresolved procedural issues.
One unresolved procedural issue is when would a
defendant's objection to a prosecutor's use of peremptory
challenges be timely? While the Court never expressly
required the objection to be timely, it impliedly required
this.213 However, the Court never defined a timely objection.
Some trial courts have quickly resolved this issue, requiring
the defendant to object prior to the jury being sworn.214 This
is a prudent requirement. It would seem unreasonable and
a waste of time to permit the defense to wait until the end
of the trial and then, in the event of a guilty verdict, argue
that the jury was unconstitutionally selected.
Another unresolved procedural issue is what should be
the extent of the defendant's participation in the Batson
inquiry? Once the defendant raises the inference of
discriminatory challenges, it is unclear whether the defendant
should be allowed to participate further. The Batson decision
Misc.2d 274, 420 N.Y.S.2d 987 (Sup. Ct. 1979) (Jewish people).
210. Note, Batson v. Kentucky and the Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenge: Arbitrary and
Capricious Equal Protection?, 74 VA. L. REv. 811, 820 (1988) [hereinafter Note].
211. Batson, 476 U.S. at 99.
212. Id at n.24.
213. Id. at 99. The Court declined to formulate a procedure "upon a defendant's timely
objection." Id. (emphasis added).
214. See, e.g, United States v. Forbes, 816 F.2d 1006, 1011 (5th Cir. 1987); State v.
Sparks, 257 Ga. 97, 98, 355 S.E.2d 658, 659 (1987); State v. Clay, 85 N.C. App. 477, 479,
355 S.E.2d 510, 512, appeal denied, 320 N.C. 634, 360 S.E.2d 96 (1987); State v. Peck, 719
S.W.2d 553, 555 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1986).
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does not specifically require that the defendant be permitted
to participate further.215  The main argument for not
permitting the defendant to be present while the prosecutor
gives his explanation is the fear of disclosing the strategy of
the prosecutor's case.216  Three Circuits have addressed this
issue. 217 Two Circuits have upheld the trial court's decision to
exclude the defense,218 while one Circuit held that the defense
can be excluded only if there is "some overriding necessity.t
219
However, the defense does play an important role when
the prosecutor offers his "neutral explanation." First, the
defense can argue the insufficiency of the prosecutor's
explanation.' Second, the defense attorney's presence would
enable a better record to be preserved for appeal."1
Therefore, limiting the defense's exclusion to only when there
is "some overriding necessity" would better serve the goals of
the defense.
As for the test itself, it is unclear in three areas. First,
there is the problem of what represents a defendant's prima
facie case. The Court gave the following general, illustrative
examples: "a 'pattern' of strikes against black jurors included
in the particular venire"m and "the prosecutor's questions and
statements during voire dire examination and in exercising his
challenges."' Justice White, in his concurrence, offered a
little further guidance by stating that the defense could not
establish a prima facie case by merely demonstrating that the
prosecution removed "one or more blacks from the jury.""4
215. See generall Batson, 476 U.S. at 79.
216. United States v. Thompson, 827 F.2d 1254, 1259 (9th Cir. 1987).
217. United States v. Davis, 809 F.2d 1194 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3234
(1987); Thompson, 827 F.2d at 1254; United States v. Tucker, 836 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1988).
218. United States v. Davis, 809 F.2d 1194 (6th Cir. 1987), cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 3234
(1987); United States v. Tucker, 836 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1988).
219. Thompson, 827 F.2d at 1258.
220. Id at 1260.
221. Id. at 1261.
222. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986).
223. Id.
224. Id. at 101 (White, J., concurring).
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Probably because of this further guidance from* Justice White,
several courts were reluctant to hold that removing a
relatively small number of minority members was enough of
a "pattern" to show a prima facie case of discrimination.'
Some courts refused to find a prima facie case of
discrimination when a prosecutor removed several black
people from the jury but could have removed an even greater
number.3
The majority in Batson could not have meant that a
large number of black people must be excluded before a
prima facie case would be shown. If this is what the majority
meant, then in some cases the Batson decision would be more
syntax then substance. That is, in those cases where there
may be only one, two, or a relatively small amount of black
people on the venire, the prosecutor would only be able to
remove a small number of black people. If the majority in
Batson did intend to require the defense to show that a large
number of black people have been excluded, then in those
cases where there are only a few black people on the venire,
the defense would have an insurmountable task indeed. A
more logical interpretation of Batson would be that while the
number of excluded black jurors will not always show a prima
facie case, a small number of exclusions would not preclude
the defense from further showing the presence of a prima
facie case.
Because the Batson Court offered little guidance of what
a prima facie case is, it would not be surprising if there were
almost as many concepts of a prima facie case as there are
reviewing courts.' Perhaps a bright-line test should be
developed. One author has suggested the use of a math
225. See, e.g, United States v. Vaccaro, 816 F.2d 443, 457 (9th Cir. 1987), cert denied,
108 S. Ct. 295 (1987); Allen v. State, 726 S.W.2d 636, 639-40 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987); Rijo
v. State, 721 S.W.2d 562, 564 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986).
226. See, eg, Clay v. State, 290 Ark. 54, 60, 716 S.W.2d 751, 754 (1986); State v.
Simms, 505 So. 2d 981, 985 (La. Ct. App. 1987); State v. Moore, 490 So. 2d 556, 558-59 (La.
Ct. App. 1986); State v. Abbott, 320 N.C. 475, 481, 358 S.E.2d 365, 369 (1987).
227. Note, supra note 210, at 821.
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formula.' Under this formula, the "actual rate of exclusion"
is compared with the "expected rate of exclusion" to determine
if a prima facie case has been shown.2 The "actual rate of
exclusion" is derived by dividing the total number peremptory
challenges the prosecution uses to remove members of the
defendant's race by the total number of people on the venire
belonging to the defendant's racial group.' The quotient of
this equation is compared with the "expected rate of
exclusion."21  This "expected rate of exclusion" is derived by
dividing the total number of peremptory challenges available
to the prosecution by the number of prospective jurors left on
the venire after the challenges for cause are used. 2  If the
"actual rate" is significantly larger than the "expected rate,"
then this would indicate a prima facie case of
discrimination. 3
An example might illustrate the usefulness of this formula.
Suppose there were 5 black people on the venire and the
prosecution removed all 5. Suppose further, that the
prosecution was entitled to 20 peremptory challenges and that
the number of people remaining on the venire after the
challenges for cause was 40. Under the above math formula,
the "actual rate" equals 1 while the "expected rate" equals
only .5." Because the "actual rate" in the above example is
228. Note, Limiting the Peremptory Challenge: Representation of Groups on Petit Juries,
86 YALE LJ. 1715, 1738-39 (1977) [hereinafter Limiting the Peremptory Challenge]. See also
Note, supra note 208, at 821.




233. Id at 1739.
234. Id.
Formula =
# of minority removed Total # of per. chall.





significantly larger than the "expected rate,"%-that is, 100
percent larger--this would be enough to show a prima facie
case.
235
Another author has proposed using specifically designed
voir dire questions as a basis for determining whether there
has been a discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. 2 6
These questions would be agreed upon by the judge and both
attorneys.237 They would be designed to elicit:
a) any inclination a prospective minority
juror might have to favor the defendant because
of their shared race;
b) any feelings the prospective juror may
have against the prosecution of members of her
race for the crime charged; and
c) any other case-related basis articulated by
the prosecutor on which the prosecutor planned
to exercise peremptory challenges.'
While the math formula suggestion would eliminate the
guess work involved in deciding whether there is a prima
facie case, it is unlikely that -many courts will adopt such a
method. The judicial system has been hesitant in allowing
math formulas to supplant the decision making process of the
judges.29 The second suggestion, though less accurate, would
probably be more palatable to the judicial system and would




236. Reiss, Prosecutorial Intent in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 135 U. PA. L. REV.
1365, 1468-69 (1987). See also Note, supra note 210, at 838.
237. Note, supra note 210, at 838.
238. Id. at 811.
239. But see, e.&, United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947)
(Judge Learned Hand using a math formula to determine negligence); American Hospital
Supply Corp. v. Hospital Products Ltd., 780 F.2d 589 (7th Cir. 1986) (Circuit Judge Posner
using a math formula to determine if preliminary injunction should be issued).
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discriminatory purpose.
The second area the test is unclear in is the type of
"neutral explanation" by the prosecution that will be sufficient.
The only guidance the Batson Court offered was that the
prosecution's explanation "need not rise to the level justifying
exercise of a challenge for cause"24 but that it must be
"related to the particular case to be tried."241 Therefore, if a
prosecutor had a legitimate purpose for removing a juror, the
prosecutor could still remove that juror even though he had
an underlying discriminatory purpose. However, what precise
level the explanation need rise to was never resolved.
Also, it is quite possible that the prosecutor's "neutral
explanation" might contain "mixed motives"-that is, a
discriminatory purpose and a legitimate purpose. This is
because the Batson Court stated that the "Equal Protection
Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors
solely on account of their race."2 Therefore, if a prosecutor
had a legitimate purpose for removing a juror, the prosecutor
could still remove that juror even though he had an underlying
discriminatory purpose. However, it is unlikely that this
mixed-motive problem will ever be resolved because if a
prosecutor has a legitimate and discriminatory purpose, he
will most likely voice only the legitimate purpose and keep
the discriminatory purpose to himself. By requiring a
prosecutor to give a neutral explanation, the effect of Batson
will be to suppress a prosecutor's racial motives to beneath
the surface. Consequently, the Batson decision, in this
instance, does not eliminate the discriminatory motives; it
just suppresses them. This problem illustrates an underlying
problem and criticism of the Batson decision.24 3 If Batson
wanted to achieve its goal of eliminating discriminatory
240. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986).
241. Id. at 98.
242. Id. at 89 (emphasis added).
243. Id. at 105-07 (Marshall, J., concurring) (peremptory challenges should be eliminated
in criminal cases). See also Note, supra note 210, at 826-30.
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purpose in jury selection, it fails in this area.
A final area in which the Batson test is unclear is what
should be the remedy if the trial court determines there has
been an equal protection violation? In a footnote, the
Batson Court stated that it "make[s] no attempt to instruct
the[] courts how best to implement [its] holding."2 4 Because
of this, Chief Justice Burger argued in his dissent:
[T]hat leaves roughly 7000 general jurisdiction
state trial judges and approximately 500 federal
trial judges at large to find their way through the
morass the court creates today. The Court
essentially wishes these judges well as they begin
the difficult enterprise of sorting out the
implications of the Court's newly created 'right.'245
The majority did suggest two possible remedies: the
trial court could "discharge the venire and select a new jury
from a panel not previously associated with the case," '246 or
the trial court could "[d]isallow the discriminatory challenges
and resume selection with the improperly challenged jurors.
reinstated on the venire."247  However, the majority stated
that it expressed no view on which might be more
appropriate.
248
The first suggestion is inefficient while still allowing the
harm to the excluded jurors to go unrectified. The second
suggestion is more judicially economical while at the same
time undoing the unconstitutional exclusion.
244. Id. at 99 n.24.
245. Id. at 131 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
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VI. EXTENSION OF BATSON
In Batson, the Court declared that it "express[ed] no
view[] on whether the Constitution imposes any limit on the
exercise of peremptory challenges by defense counsel."' 9
Consequently, it is currently the rule in the federal jurisdiction
and all but a few states, that a defense attorney may use his
peremptory challenges in a discriminatory manner.20
While the .Court "express[ed] no view' '25 on the
applicability of its decision to the defense, it did state that
"[p]ublic respect for our criminal justice system and the rule
of law will be strengthened if we ensure that no citizen is
disqualified from jury service because of his race. 25 2
Certainly, if "public respect" is harmed when the prosecution
removes a juror because of his race, isn't that same "public
respect" harmed when the defense does so? It makes no
difference to the community which side does the
discriminating. The bottom line is that a juror was
discriminated against because of his race. Therefore, while
the Court expressly declined to comment on the extension of
Batson to the defense, its dicta implies that it must.
Additionally, the Court recognized that there was a harm
to the "excluded juror" when the prosecution discriminated.5 3
Certainly, it doesn't matter to the excluded juror who
discriminated against him. To the excluded juror, he was
denied the privilege of serving his country, state, and
community, simply because of his race. Therefore, the
''excluded juror" is no less "harmed" when the defense
discriminates against him or when the prosecution does.
249. Id at 89 n.12.
250. Note, Discrimination by the Defense: Peremptory Challenges after Batson v. Kentucky,
88 COLUM. L. REv. 355, 355 n.2 (citing People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148
Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499 (1979);
and State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481, 486 (Fla. 1984)).
251. Batson, 476 U.S. at 89 n.12.
252. Batson, 476 U.S. at 99.
253. Id. at 87.
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Finally, it was said long ago that when black people are
separated "from others of similar age and qualifications solely
because of their race ... a feeling of inferiority as to their
status in the community" is generated. 2s4  This is true no
matter which side of the adversarial table does the
discriminating. The effect is that the striking of jurors
because of their race implies that they are incapable of sitting
as jurors and deciding a case solely on the basis of the
evidence presented. Not only is this notion unsupported by
any factual study, it should not be countenanced by a society
whose justice is blind.
The only argument against extending Batson to the
defense is that there may be no "state action." As was
discussed earlier, there must be "state action" for there to be
an equal protection violation.2" However, while the presence
of "state action" may not be readily identifiable when the
defense uses its peremptory challenges, it is nevertheless,
present.
The use of peremptory challenges is currently provided
for by statute in every state? 6  Because the right to use
peremptory challenges is not constitutionally mandated, 7 the
defense utilizes a state created right whenever it uses a
peremptory challenge. This state created right is used in a
state court, and its use is regulated by a state judge. Because
the action by state courts is regarded as action by the state
within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment,25' the equal
protection clause is violated when the defense uses a
peremptory challenge to exclude a juror because of his race.
Therefore, Batson should be extended to the defense.
If Batson should be extended to the defense side of
criminal trials, then it should also be extended to civil trials
254. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1955).
255. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
256. See Gurney, supra note 25, at 228 n.5 (citing every state statute).
257. Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919).
258. Shelly v Kraemer, 334 U.S., 1, 14 (1948).
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as well. While it is true the Batson decision involved the use
of peremptory challenges in a criminal trial, there is no
reason to limit its application to criminal trials. The same
considerations that were discussed above, apply with equal
force for applying Batson to civil trials.
VII. MOVING FORWARD
As the preceding discussion illustrates, the Batson test
created new problems and left some old ones unresolved.
Admittedly, the Supreme Court may have been hesitant to
radically change a trial procedure that has been used in this
country for over 200 years.25 However, if these problems
prove to be too troublesome, then perhaps further steps
should be taken.
A possible further step would be to reduce the number
of peremptory challenges allocated to each attorney. In fact,
in 1976, the Supreme Court made this suggestion.2' The
Court proposed an amendment to Rule 24(b) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure.261 This amendment would have
reduced the number of peremptory challenges to twelve for
both sides in capital offenses and five for both sides in felony
offenses. 2  However, Congress rejected this amendment. 3
While a mere reduction in the total number of
peremptory challenges would decrease the number of
unconstitutionally excluded jurors, the attorney would still be
able to unconstitutionally discriminate. Only the frequency of
his constitutional violations would decrease. One author has
suggested that the number of peremptory challenges given to
an attorney be equal to only a fraction of the amount of
259. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 112 (1986) (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
260. H.R. Doc. No. 464, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Act of July 30, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-78, § 2(c), 91 Stat. 319, 320 (1977).
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minorities on the venire.26 This suggestion would have more
of an impact on the elimination of discriminatory peremptory
challenges. This is because if an attorney realizes that it is
impossible for him to remove all the minority members, he
might be less willing to violate the Batson rule.26  The
drawback to this fractional reduction is that it focuses
attention on the race of the prospective jurors; the precise
evil that Batson tried to eliminate.
Perhaps a "punitive reduction" would be an appropriate
alternative to a fractional reduction.2' If a trial judge
determines that an attorney has violated the Batson rule,
then the judge could order a reduction in the number of
peremptories available to the attorney. In this way, the
attorney would have fewer peremptories available when he is
in front of the venire for the second time. For example, if an
attorney begins a trial with ten peremptory challenges and the
judge determines that the attorney violated Batson, the judge
could reduce the attorney's peremptories to five. This
suggestion is premised on a deterrent rationale. If an attorney
realizes he runs the risk of having fewer peremptory
challenges as his opponent, he will most likely refrain from
taking the risk of violating Batson.
Reducing the number of peremptory challenges, however,
does not completely eliminate the problem. Therefore, if
Batson does prove to be unworkable the next step will be to
totally eliminate the peremptory challenge system. Justice
Marshall is of a similar view. In his concurrence in Batson,
he argued that the majority did not go far enough. He
advocated for the total elimination of peremptory challenges
in the criminal justice system.267 The majority rejected this
proposition and stated that peremptories should not be
264. Note, supra note 210, at 837.
265. Id.
266. Limiting the Peremptoty Challenge, supra note 228 at 1740. See also Note, supra
note 210, at 837.
267. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 103 (1986) (Marshall, CJ., concurring).
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"abolished [simply] because of an apprehension that
prosecutors and trial judges will not perform conscientiously
their respective duties under the Constitution."'  But, if it is
possible to conduct a trial with only the use of four
peremptory challenges per side,269 then how much more
burdensome would it be to conduct a trial without any
peremptory challenges. Since "there is nothing in the
Constitution"'r which requires the peremptory challenge
system, then in the event that Batson does prove to be
unworkable, the next step would be to eliminate this "crude
and uncertain device.""r7  Additionally, if it is true that the
peremptory challenge system "permits those to discriminate
who are of a mind to discriminate ''2 2 then the total
elimination of peremptory challenges would move closer to
the goal of eliminating discrimination in the jury selection
process.
There are those who favor only eliminating the
prosecution's use of peremptory challenges.273 However, this
approach is unreasonable. If the scales between the state
and the defendant "are to be evenly held,"'27 4 then this
proposal would be unacceptable to American jurisprudence.
Additionally, if the possibility of peremptory challenge abuse
is so great on the prosecution side, certainly is it just as great
on the defense side. Consequently, if one side of the trial
system is precluded from using peremptory challenges, then
both sides should be.
268. Id. at 99 n.22.
269. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-262 (1983).
270. Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919).
271. Massaro, supra note 8, at 561.
272. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96 (citing Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)).
273. See, e.g., Massaro, supra note 8.




Unfortunately, there will probably be more Howard Beach
incidents in the future. Undoubtedly, discrimination will most
likely continue in this society for quite some time. However,
we are not powerless to fight discrimination. While it is
improbable to suggest that significant advances can be made
over night, advances can be made with the hope that some
day the Howard Beach incidents never occur again.
This note has addressed one small area where
discrimination can be fought; the selection of jurors.
Specifically, this note focused on the discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges. As demonstrated by the Swain and
Batson decisions, the Supreme Court seeks to eliminate
discrimination in the jury selection process. Prior to these
two decisions, the prosecution could use its peremptory
challenges in an unfettered manner. Subsequent to Batson,
however, this power was eliminated. Nevertheless, a large
crevasse still goes unbridged. The defense is still permitted
to discriminate in the jury selection process. This has allowed
an anomaly to form in the law; we won't let a party enter the
courts and use the judicial process to enforce a racially
restrictive real estate covenant, 275 yet we will allow a party to
use that same judicial process to exclude a juror solely on
account of his race.
The Supreme Court must address this issue. It is only
then, after a second Supreme Court decision, that this
unacceptable crevasse will be closed universally. When the
Supreme Court decided Batson, it should have made the leap
to the elimination of the discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges in one bound. Instead, the Supreme Court has
deferred to a later date or to the lower level courts to make
that second leap. Perhaps the Supreme Court was unaware
that it is imprudent "to attempt to leap a chasm in two
275. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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bounds.""26
While the Batson decision does make significant
advancements down the road to discrimination free jury
selection, its one-sided application and unclear test makes it
similar to an automobile with its two right tires deflated and
its steering column removed. In order for Batson to be used
as an effective vehicle for fighting discrimination, the Court
has to repair the tires and correct the steering. The Court
can do this by applying Batson to the defense and by
providing a clearer test. If these "repairs" prove to be
ineffective, then it will be necessary to abandon Batson as a
vehicle and use a new vehicle free of the unnecessary weight
of the peremptory challenge system.
Donald C. Hanratty, Jr.
276. Rubin, Does Law Matter? A Judge's Response to the Critical Legal Studies Movement,
37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 307, 308 (1987) (quoting Benjamin Disraeli, the first Earl of Beaconsfield
from 1804-81).
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